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3. AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP LAW 
Pearlie KOH 
LLB (Hons) (National University of Singapore),  
LLM (University of Melbourne); Advocate & Solicitor (Singapore); 
Associate Professor, Singapore Management University, School of Law. 
Stephen BULL 
BA, LLB (Hons) (Wellington), LLM (Harvard);  
Solicitor (England and Wales), Barrister and Solicitor (New Zealand), 
Member of the New York Bar;  
Associate Professor (Practice), Singapore Management University,  
School of Law. 
[NB: The agency law section was contributed by Pearlie Koh; and the 
partnership law section was contributed by Stephen Bull.] 
AGENCY LAW 
Creation of agency 
3.1 The question of whether an agency relationship existed between 
the issuing bank and the nominated bank in the context of a 
documentary credit transaction arose in Grains and Industrial Products 
Trading Pte Ltd v Bank of India.1 In brief, Indian Bank issued a letter of 
credit in favour of Grains and Industrial Products Trading Pte Ltd 
(“GRIPT”) which incorporated the terms of the Uniform Customs and 
Practice for Documentary Credits 600 (“UCP 600”). The Bank of India 
(“BOI”) was nominated to accept a presentation of documents and to 
effect payment on the letter of credit. Documents complying with the 
specifications under the letter of credit were tendered by GRIPT to BOI 
in good time. BOI did not pay the contract price but, eventually, 
transmitted the documents to Indian Bank a month after receipt, by 
which time the letter of credit had expired. Indian Bank rejected the 
documents and declined to honour the letter of credit. The Court of 
Appeal affirmed the decision of the High Court that Indian Bank was 
liable to do so. Under the terms of UCP 600, the issuing bank’s liability 
to honour the credit at its maturity was triggered once the beneficiary 
made a complying and timely presentation to the nominated bank. 
Indian Bank claimed against BOI for an indemnity in respect of its 
liability to GRIPT. The question, as far as is relevant for present 
                                                                        
1 [2016] 3 SLR 1308. 
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purposes, was whether BOI was the agent of Indian Bank for the 
purposes of the receipt of the documents. 
3.2 The Court of Appeal was not unanimous on this particular 
issue. The majority of judges, comprising Sundaresh Menon CJ and 
Andrew Phang Boon Leong JA, held that BOI was an agent of Indian 
Bank. Menon CJ (delivering judgment on behalf of Phang JA and 
himself) stated:2 
… A nominated bank can be an agent of the issuing bank to the extent 
of the issuing bank’s mandate. The agency relationship will arise in so 
far as the nominated bank accepts the authority granted by the issuing 
bank for it to transact with the beneficiary on its behalf … 
An agency relationship will be found when a nominated bank acts on 
the issuing bank’s mandate because when it does so, it has the power 
to affect the issuing bank’s rights and liabilities as against the 
beneficiary on matters so authorised … 
[emphasis in original] 
3.3 Although BOI did not “accept” the nomination in the sense of 
honouring or negotiating the credit, the majority of judges found that 
the “separate matter of it receiving the documents when these were 
presented by the beneficiary” amounted to BOI acting on and, thus, 
accepting its nomination.3 Accordingly, by its conduct, BOI was 
“properly constituted as the agent of Indian Bank for the purposes of 
receiving the documents”.4 The majority of judges had accepted, at least 
apparently, that the mere fact that BOI had to receive the documents 
presented by the beneficiary was sufficient to constitute it an agent of 
the Indian Bank for that purpose. 
3.4 In contrast, Chan Sek Keong SJ took the view that there was no 
agency on the facts as BOI did not “act on its nomination”. It did not 
honour or negotiate the documents presented and, therefore, did not 
perform any of the acts that it was “mandated” to do under the 
documentary credit.5 His Honour stated:6 
                                                                        
2 Grains and Industrial Products Trading Pte Ltd v Bank of India [2016] 3 SLR 1308 
at [69]–[70]. 
3 Grains and Industrial Products Trading Pte Ltd v Bank of India [2016] 3 SLR 1308 
at [79]. 
4 Grains and Industrial Products Trading Pte Ltd v Bank of India [2016] 3 SLR 1308 
at [80]. 
5 Grains and Industrial Products Trading Pte Ltd v Bank of India [2016] 3 SLR 1308 
at [211]. 
6 Grains and Industrial Products Trading Pte Ltd v Bank of India [2016] 3 SLR 1308 
at [189]. 
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… The rights and obligations of a nominated bank and the issuing 
bank are governed by and flow from the articles set out in UCP 600. 
The articles operate as contractual provisions between the parties to 
the letter of credit which has incorporated them. The articles make no 
mention of agency, and it is suggested that agency reasoning is not 
necessary to their operation as contractual provisions. 
3.5 The divergence in views appeared to be centred on what 
precisely BOI, as the nominated bank, was “authorised” to do, and the 
point at which the nominated bank “acted” on this authority. According 
to James Byrne et al7 (“Byrne”), whose commentary is considered “one 
of the leading treatises on the construction of UCP 600”,8 “[t]he essence 
of the role of a nominated bank is that it is authorised to hono[u]r its 
obligation, or to pay, incur a deferred payment undertaking, accept or 
negotiate”.9 Whilst this was how Chan SJ saw the authority conferred by 
Indian Bank on BOI,10 the majority of judges were prepared to accept 
that the nominated bank’s “authority” could mean acceptance of a 
presentation of documents (that is, the physical act of receipt) by the 
beneficiary without the nominated bank honouring the credit.11 
3.6 Clearly, the majority of judges were, with respect, somewhat 
more generous in their conception of the scope of the nominated bank’s 
authority. Arguably, this may translate into too low a threshold for the 
imposition of an agency relationship between the issuing bank and the 
nominating bank. This is especially since Art 12 of UCP 600 placed the 
decision whether to honour or negotiate the credit (what the nominated 
bank was “authorised” to do) squarely within the discretion of the 
nominating bank itself. 
3.7 All the judges were agreed that, as a matter of law, agency is a 
consensual relationship characterised by the agent’s power to affect the 
principal’s legal position.12 As the majority of judges noted, “[a]t its core, 
agency connotes an agent being granted power or authority to affect the 
                                                                        
7 James E Byrne, Vincent M Maulella, Soh Chee Seng, & Alexander V Zelenov, 
UCP 600: An Analytical Commentary (Institute of International Law & Practice, 
2010). 
8 Grains and Industrial Products Trading Pte Ltd v Bank of India [2016] 3 SLR 1308 
at [51]. 
9 James E Byrne, Vincent M Maulella, Soh Chee Seng, & Alexander V Zelenov, 
UCP 600: An Analytical Commentary (Institute of International Law & Practice, 
2010) at p 173. 
10 Grains and Industrial Products Trading Pte Ltd v Bank of India [2016] 3 SLR 1308 
at [196]. 
11 Grains and Industrial Products Trading Pte Ltd v Bank of India [2016] 3 SLR 1308 
at [73]. 
12 Grains and Industrial Products Trading Pte Ltd v Bank of India [2016] 3 SLR 1308 
at [79] and [179]. 
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principal’s legal relations as against third parties” [emphasis added]. In 
the present case, however, the principal’s liability to the beneficiary was 
not dependent on any act of the nominated bank, but wholly on the acts 
of the beneficiary (that is, the third party) itself. Thus:13 
… If the issuing bank nominates a bank in accordance with UCP 600, 
then as between the beneficiary and the issuing bank, Art 7(a) of 
UCP 600 provides that the latter’s liability is engaged as long as the 
beneficiary makes a valid and complying presentation to the nominated 
bank … [emphasis added] 
3.8 In the circumstances, it is, with respect, difficult to appreciate 
how a nominated bank, invited on the terms of UCP 600, could have 
been an “agent” as defined. The majority of judges had made reference 
to the following statement in Canadian Agency Law,14 with emphasis 
placed on the word “agent”: 
Agency is the relationship that exists between two persons when one, 
called the agent, is considered in law to represent the other, called the 
principal, in such a way as to be able to affect the principal’s legal 
position by the making of contracts or the disposition of property. 
3.9 With respect, the emphasis should perhaps have been placed on 
the manner in which the agent is able to “affect the principal’s legal 
position”, and that is, according to Fridman, “by the making of contracts 
or the disposition of property”. It does not appear that BOI, as the 
nominated bank, was conferred any authority to contract with the 
beneficiary, GRIPT, on Indian Bank’s behalf as such; indeed, the 
majority of judges had held that it was the letter of credit, issued by 
Indian Bank itself, that gave rise to the relationship between GRIPT and 
Indian Bank. As Byrne noted, “[u]nder the UCP, a nominated bank is 
independent of the applicant, issuer, or another nominated bank. It acts, 
if it acts, on its own behalf and in its own interest.”15 The finding of an 
agency relationship between the banks, therefore, sits somewhat 
uncomfortably with the nature of their relationship as defined by 
UCP 600. 
                                                                        
13 Grains and Industrial Products Trading Pte Ltd v Bank of India [2016] 3 SLR 1308 
at [55]. 
14 G H L Fridman, Canadian Agency Law (LexisNexis, 2009) ch 1, at p 4. 
15 James E Byrne, Vincent M Maulella, Soh Chee Seng, & Alexander V Zelenov, 
UCP 600: An Analytical Commentary (Institute of International Law & Practice, 
2010) at p 516. 
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Apparent authority 
3.10 The locus classicus on what amounts to apparent authority is 
Diplock LJ’s statement in Freeman & Lockyer v Buckhurst Park Properties 
(Mangal) Ltd:16 
[Apparent authority is established in a] legal relationship between the 
principal and the contractor created by a representation, made by the 
principal to the contractor, intended to be and in fact acted upon by 
the contractor, that the agent has authority to enter on behalf of the 
principal into a contract of a kind within the scope of the ‘apparent’ 
authority, so as to render the principal liable to perform any 
obligations imposed upon him by such contract. To the relationship so 
created the agent is a stranger. He need not be (although he generally 
is) aware of the existence of the representation but he must not 
purport to make the agreement as principal himself … 
3.11 It is, therefore, the principal’s representation to the contractor 
that provides the basis of his liability. In order that the principal is made 
liable, the evidence must necessarily be sufficient to justify this 
conclusion. In Viet Hai Petroleum Corp v Ng Jun Quan17 (“Viet Hai 
Petroleum”), the High Court accepted that a business card that gave the 
alleged agent’s designation as “Chief Operation Officer” was, if genuine, 
a representation from the employer-principal that the agent was indeed 
appointed as such. Therefore, the authenticity of the business card is 
crucial, for otherwise, the representation cannot be said to have 
originated from the principal. The court made reference to Martin v 
Britannia Life Ltd18 (“Martin”), a decision of the English High Court, 
and to the New South Wales case of Heperu Pty Ltd v Morgan Brooks Pty 
Ltd (No 2)19 (“Heperu”), in support of this proposition. Specifically, the 
court noted that in both of these cases, the business card bore, as would 
be typical, the principal’s logo and address, as well as the agent’s 
designation and telephone and fax numbers. In Viet Hai Petroleum, the 
alleged agent had handed to the contractor a name card that similarly 
“bore [the principal’s] logo, its address, [the agent’s] designation and his 
contact numbers”.20 The court appeared to have extrapolated from this 
that, hence, “[t]here was no reason for [a contractor] to doubt the 
authenticity of [the agent’s] card”.21 
3.12 With respect, the factual contexts in those earlier decisions 
should be noted. In Martin, it was common ground that the principal 
                                                                        
16 [1964] 2 QB 480 at [503]. 
17 [2016] 3 SLR 887. 
18 [1999] All ER (D) 1495. 
19 [2007] NSWSC 1438. 
20 Viet Hai Petroleum Corp v Ng Jun Quan [2016] 3 SLR 887 at [36]. 
21 Viet Hai Petroleum Corp v Ng Jun Quan [2016] 3 SLR 887 at [36]. 
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had supplied the agent with the business card. It was, therefore, not in 
dispute that the principal had made the representation contained in the 
card. In Heperu, there were other significant facts that supported the 
conclusion that the principal had held the agent out as authorised.22 The 
conclusion that the principal had held out the agent as having apparent 
authority was, therefore, not founded solely on the business card alone. 
Seen in context, then, these cases do not stand for the general 
proposition that business cards, in the absence of affirmative proof of 
their authenticity, amount to adequate representation for the purposes 
of establishing apparent authority. 
3.13 Nevertheless, the context of the High Court’s judgment must 
itself be emphasised. The resolution of this particular issue was made 
necessary by the principal’s submission of no case to answer. In the 
circumstances, all that was necessary was for the plaintiff third party to 
establish a prima facie case of apparent authority. 
Agency by estoppel 
3.14 The representation on which apparent authority rests is said to 
“operate as an estoppel”23 so that the principal is precluded from 
denying the authority of the agent to bind him. This is generally 
accepted. Indeed, as a matter of nomenclature, Fridman would consider 
apparent authority as one and the same as “agency by estoppel”.24 
Fridman, however, saw no need to further assimilate the doctrine of 
apparent authority within any substantive doctrine of estoppel. In his 
view:25 
[A]cceptance of the proposition that apparent authority depends on 
the application of the idea of estoppel is not precluded by the 
possibility that the version of estoppel relevant to and appropriate for 
the doctrine of apparent authority is not necessarily the same as that 
applicable in other contexts. 
                                                                        
22 See especially Heperu Pty Ltd v Morgan Brooks Pty Ltd (No 2) [2007] NSWSC 1438 
at [69]–[73]. 
23 Freeman & Lockyer v Buckhurst Park Properties (Mangal) Ltd [1964] 2 QB 480 
at 503, Rama Corp Ltd v Proved Tin and General Investments Ltd [1952] 2 QB 147 
at 149. 
24 G H L Fridman, “Variations on the Theme of Authority” (2006) 22 JCL 105 at 110; 
see also W Seavey, “The Rationale of Agency” (1920) 29 Yale LJ 859 at 873. 
25 G H L Fridman, “Variations on the Theme of Authority” (2006) 22 JCL 105 at 110; 
see also Bowstead & Reynolds on Agency (Peter G Watts gen ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, 
20th Ed, 2016) at para 8-028; Roderick Munday, Agency: Law and Principles (OUP, 
2010) at para 4.48. 
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3.15 In The Bunga Melati 5,26 the Court of Appeal weighed in on the 
question of whether the doctrine of apparent authority ought to be 
properly placed within the larger doctrine of estoppel. The facts in brief 
are as follows. The plaintiff had delivered bunkers to the defendant’s 
ships for which it had not been paid. The contracts for these bunkers 
were negotiated through bunker brokers, who would connect the buyers 
with the vendors. However, unbeknownst to the plaintiff, the party who 
dealt with the brokers was not the defendant, but Market Asia Link Sdn 
Bhd (“MAL”), a supplier of bunkers. The defendant had approved MAL 
as a “registered bunker vendor”, and had purchased significant amounts 
of bunker fuel from MAL. The plaintiff asserted that MAL was at all 
times acting as the defendant’s agent, and that it had actual and/or 
apparent authority from the defendant to contract with the plaintiff. It 
will be recalled that these arguments failed before the High Court. It was 
further contended that the defendant was estopped from denying the 
authority of MAL as it had known that MAL had been representing itself 
as the defendant’s agent to suppliers. This argument also failed, and the 
plaintiff appealed, pursuing only the point on estoppel. 
3.16 The plaintiff ’s appeal was, therefore, premised on there being a 
distinction between the concepts of apparent authority on the one hand, 
and agency by estoppel, or sometimes referred to as “estoppel by 
representation”,27 on the other. The Court of Appeal, however, opined 
that the “difference between agency by estoppel and apparent authority 
is not … that apparent”.28 In the court’s view, the jurisdiction to impose 
liability on someone (the principal) for the acts of another who is 
unauthorised is predicated on the “unconscionability” that results from 
“some act or omission on the part of the principal that leads to the third 
party acting or continuing to act in a particular way to his detriment or 
suffering hardship”.29 Given this common premise, the court suggested 
that, even with apparent authority, the inquiry should be undertaken 
within the traditional framework for estoppel. And, this would require 
satisfaction of the elements of representation, reliance, and detriment.30 
3.17 Whilst there is undoubtedly some “kinship” between apparent 
authority and agency by estoppel, the two doctrines may not be 
activated by the same elements nor is their respective reach exactly 
coterminous. Lord Diplock’s definition of “apparent authority”31 suggests 
that apparent authority depends not only on a positive representation by 
                                                                        
26 [2016] 2 SLR 1114. 
27 Roderick Munday, Agency: Law and Principles (OUP, 2010) at para 4.48. 
28 The Bunga Melati 5 [2016] 2 SLR 1114 at [8]. 
29 The Bunga Melati 5 [2016] 2 SLR 1114 at [12]. 
30 The Bunga Melati 5 [2016] 2 SLR 1114 at [12]. 
31 See para 3.10. 
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the principal as to the authority of the agent, but also on there being at 
least the appearance of an agency relationship between the principal and 
his alleged agent. Neither of these, it would seem, is necessary to 
establish agency by estoppel. In Spiro v Lintern32 (“Spiro”), the decision 
that is credited with first applying the concept of estoppel to agency 
cases and which was referred to by the Court of Appeal, the English 
Court of Appeal premised its decision on the following principle:33 
[I]f A sees B acting in the mistaken belief that A is under some binding 
obligation to him and in a manner consistent only with the existence 
of such an obligation, which would be to B’s disadvantage if A were 
thereafter to deny the obligation, A is under a duty to B to disclose the 
non-existence of the supposed obligation. 
3.18 Comparing this exposition of the estoppel principle with 
Lord Diplock’s explanation of apparent authority, three possible points 
of divergence are suggested. First, it is unnecessary, for the purposes of 
estoppel, that the mistaken impression under which the plaintiff 
contractor was labouring should have originated from the defendant 
himself. Rather, it is the defendant’s inaction, despite an awareness of the 
plaintiff ’s mistaken belief and in circumstances where he would 
reasonably be expected to have disabused the plaintiff of his belief, that 
gives rise to the estoppel. The Court of Appeal would not, however, 
consider this to be a difference of any substance at all. This is because 
the principal’s inaction can only found estoppel if the principal is under 
an obligation or duty to act. Thus:34 
[A]lthough [the principal] has made no affirmative representation, by 
his omission or failure to correct the misapprehension when the law 
regards him as being bound to do so, he is taken to have represented 
that the misapprehended state of affairs is in fact true. 
3.19 Secondly, the estoppel principle applies even in cases involving 
undisclosed principals, where the plaintiff would have dealt with the 
agent as principal. Indeed, in Spiro, the plaintiff had been wholly 
unaware that the “agent” was acting for anyone other than herself. In 
contrast, the doctrine of apparent authority, on Lord Diplock’s statement 
of law, applies where the agent did “not purport to make the agreement 
as principal himself ”.35 The Court of Appeal did not deal with this as a 
possible point of difference. Though, if the doctrine of apparent 
authority is indeed so circumscribed, it will mean that its scope of 
application is generally somewhat narrower and more specific than 
estoppel. 
                                                                        
32 [1973] 1 WLR 1002. 
33 Spiro v Lintern [1973] 1 WLR 1002 at 1011. 
34 The Bunga Melati 5 [2016] 2 SLR 1114 at [13]. 
35 See para 3.10. 
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3.20 The third point is that liability on the part of the alleged 
principal is dependent on evidence of some disadvantage or detriment 
suffered by the plaintiff in reliance on the mistaken impression that the 
defendant principal had permitted to subsist by his inaction. 
Detrimental reliance is essential for genuine estoppel to arise.36 Yet, as 
Munday observed, “in very many agency cases the courts require only 
an alteration of position, and not evidence of a detriment suffered.”37 
Indeed, Fridman also noted that “[t]he necessity to prove unconscionable 
conduct and the relation of the quantum of detriment to the available 
relief are not characteristics of … the doctrine of apparent authority”.38 
In seemingly assimilating the doctrine of apparent authority within the 
broader doctrine of estoppel, the Court of Appeal might be taken to 
suggest that detriment should be established, even for apparent 
authority cases. This, with respect, is significant indeed. 
3.21 As the present case was argued on the basis of estoppel, it was 
essential for the evidence to disclose that the defendant knew that the 
plaintiff was operating under a misapprehension as to the facts. As the 
plaintiff was unable to establish this knowledge, the appeal was 
dismissed. 
PARTNERSHIP LAW 
Dissolution of partnership 
3.22 For the second year running, the main partnership law case 
concerned the effect of limitation on a deceased partner’s claim. This 
arose in Lai Hoon Woon v Lai Foong Sin39 (“Lai Hoon Woon”), which was 
otherwise mainly concerned with trust law and the validity of a will 
executed by one Lai Thai Lok (the “Deceased”). Since 1985, the 
Deceased and his second son, the first defendant, had been partners in a 
neighbourhood department-store business (the “Boon Lay Shop”). After 
another son withdrew in 1993, their partnership shares were in the ratio 
of 51:49 respectively. The partners conducted the business on premises 
in Boon Lay, the leasehold of which they acquired in 1993 as tenants-in-
common in the same proportions. There had been family-related 
disputes between the two partners for some years. On the day of the 
                                                                        
36 Hong Leong Singapore Finance Ltd v United Overseas Bank Ltd [2007] 1 SLR(R) 292 
at [170], George Whitechurch Ltd v Cavanagh [1902] 1 AC 117 at 135. 
37 Roderick Munday, Agency: Law and Principles (OUP, 2010) at para 4.42; see also 
Bowstead & Reynolds on Agency (Peter G Watts gen ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, 20th Ed, 
2016) at para 8-024. 
38 G H L Fridman, “Variations on the Theme of Authority” (2006) 22 JCL 105 at 109. 
39 [2016] SGHC 113. 
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Deceased’s passing in 2003, the first defendant unilaterally updated the 
business registration records at the Accounting and Corporate 
Regulatory Authority to show that the Boon Lay Shop was held in his 
sole name. Years later, in 2012, the plaintiff, who was the executor of the 
Deceased’s estate, sought, inter alia, an order requiring the first 
defendant to register the Deceased’s 51% interest in the Boon Lay 
property in the plaintiff as executor. In addition, the plaintiff sought an 
account of the profits of the Boon Lay Shop for the period beginning 
with the Deceased’s death. It is the latter claim which is of interest under 
partnership law. 
3.23 In the High Court, Kannan Ramesh JC (as he then was) rejected 
on the facts the first defendant’s arguments that he had purchased the 
Deceased’s 51% interests in the Boon Lay Shop and the associated 
leasehold property in 1993.40 Accordingly, at the time of his death in 
2003, the Deceased was a 51% partner in the Boon Lay Shop business. 
Since that time, the business had been operated by the first defendant 
for his sole benefit. The plaintiff as executor had, therefore, claimed an 
account of the profits. However, this claim was rejected by the court on 
the basis that it was time-barred under s 6 of the Limitation Act.41 
3.24 In the absence of a contrary agreement, a partnership is 
dissolved by the death of a partner: s 33(1) of the Partnership Act.42 
There was no suggestion of a contrary agreement in this case: the firm 
had been dissolved by death. However, in these proceedings, the 
Deceased’s estate did not seek a winding-up, but simply claimed post-
dissolution profits: these are dealt with under s 42 of the Partnership 
Act, which has been held to pertain only to revenue profits. Where a 
partner dies and the surviving partner(s) continues the business without 
any final settlement of accounts with his estate, the latter is entitled, 
absent contrary agreement, to elect to receive either: (i) a share of the 
post-dissolution profits which is attributable to the use of the deceased 
partner’s share of the firm’s assets; or (ii) interest at 5% per annum on 
such share of the assets. The rationale underlying s 42 is that, until 
winding-up or other settlement of accounts, a deceased partner’s estate 
still has an interest in the partnership property and so is entitled to be 
compensated for any ongoing use of his “share” of the assets to generate 
profits. Calculating the amount of such attributable profit share can raise 
complex issues;43 hence, the simpler option of using a fixed interest rate 
is available. In this case, given the court’s finding that the Limitation Act 
applied, quantification issues did not have to be addressed. 
                                                                        
40 Lai Hoon Woon v Lai Foong Sin [2016] SGHC 113 at [228]. 
41 Cap 163, 1996 Rev Ed. 
42 Cap 391, 1994 Rev Ed. 
43 See, eg, Sandhu v Gill [2006] 2 WLR 8. 
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3.25 The question of limitation in relation to claims specifically 
under s 42 does not appear to have been considered before in Singapore 
or in England. The High Court held that the relevant provision of the 
Limitation Act was s 6(2), rather than s 6(1), albeit that under both the 
limitation period is the same, that is, six years. Section 6(1)(a) applied to 
an outgoing partner’s (or his estate’s) claim for his share of the 
partnership property. Such claim was deemed to be one for a debt under 
s 43 of the Partnership Act; hence, the contractual limitation period 
applied: see Chiam Heng Hsien v Chiam Heng Chow44 (“Mitre Hotel”). 
But a claim under s 42 was different: it was for a share of post-dissolution 
profits and s 43 and, thus, s 6(1)(a) had no application. Hence, the court 
held that s 6(2) – which sets a time bar on actions for an account – 
applied to this claim. 
3.26 The court did not agree with the Indian authority of Nagarajan v 
Hotz,45 on which the plaintiff had relied. That case held that, under the 
Indian equivalent of s 42, the “cause of action continues from day to 
day” and was not subject to limitation at all. With respect, the Indian 
decision is not necessarily wrong, but is distinguishable. The relevant 
limitation period in the Indian Limitation Act, 190846 applied to claims 
for an account of the “profits of a dissolved partnership”. The Indian 
court held that this related only to the pre-dissolution period. Thus, 
there was no Indian limitation period which applied to s 42 claims at 
the time. In Singapore, on the other hand, s 6(2) is clearly apt to cover 
s 42 claims. 
3.27 Nevertheless, a question remains as to how s 6(2) applies to a 
s 42 claim. That subsection bars an account “brought in respect of any 
matter that arose more than six years before commencement of the 
action”. The firm was dissolved in 2003 and the writ was served more 
than six years later (that is, in 2012). The court held that s 6(2) applied 
to bar the claim completely.47 His Honour cited Knox v Gye,48 which had 
been approved by the Court of Appeal in Mitre Hotel. Knox v Gye has 
been said to have established a “general rule” that the limitation period 
in an action for an account between partners or ex-partners is six years 
after dissolution. In Knox v Gye, some ten years after a partner’s death, 
his estate sought an account for his share in a debt which had been due 
to the firm before, but was only received by the surviving partner five 
years after, the dissolution. The House of Lords held that the claim 
became time-barred six years after the dissolution; part of the reasoning 
                                                                        
44 [2015] 4 SLR 180, discussed in (2015) 16 SAL Ann Rev 87 at 97. 
45 [1954] AIR PH 278. 
46 9 of 1908. 
47 Lai Hoon Woon v Lai Foong Sin [2016] SGHC 113 at [264]. 
48 (1871) LR 5 HL 656. 
© 2017 Contributor(s) and Singapore Academy of Law. 
No part of this document may be reproduced without permission from the copyright holders. 
 
  
(2016) 17 SAL Ann Rev Agency and Partnership Law 87 
 
was that the sum due could and should have been captured by an 
account of the assets of the partnership, had one been taken as at 
dissolution. For limitation purposes, the “matter” giving rise to the 
account was the dissolution itself. Further, the late receipt of the debt did 
not reset the limitation clock; if it did, there would be no finality. 
3.28 With respect, however, it is arguable that, in relation to s 42, 
limitation only starts to run once the relevant profits have accrued: that 
is, the “matters” subject to the account are those accruing profits. The 
profits relevant to s 42 only begin to accrue after dissolution: they are 
not profits of the partnership but of a post-partnership business, against 
which the former partner has a statutory claim. This is so even though 
one factor in that claim, that is, the former partner’s share of the assets, 
refers back to the state of affairs at dissolution. It is hard to see the logic 
of limiting a claim for post-dissolution profits to a period of six years 
after dissolution when some of those profits may only be earned after 
such deadline: one cannot claim what does not yet exist. It is submitted, 
therefore, that Knox v Gye is distinguishable from this case. If so, the 
time bar would apply not simply six years after dissolution, but only to 
those post-dissolution profits which arise more than six years before the 
suit is brought. On that basis, the profits arising between 2006 and 2012 
in Lai Hoon Woon may have been relevant under s 42. 
3.29 But even if there was no applicable time bar, the plaintiff ’s claim 
under s 42 would have faced formidable practical difficulties. Assuming 
that he opted for the 5% interest alternative, he would still have had to 
establish the quantum of the Deceased’s “share of the assets”. That share, 
it has been held, is to be determined as at the dissolution date, which 
may be challenging after such a period. Further, the allowance which is 
generally accorded to a continuing partner for managing the post-
dissolution business may have mounted up over the unusually long 
period in this case. 
3.30 On a different point, in both Mitre Hotel and the present case, 
the Limitation Act was enforced against a claim by a deceased partner’s 
estate. Yet, the estate in Mitre Hotel ended up with nothing, whereas in 
this case, the estate regained the Deceased’s share of the leasehold 
property. The explanation for the difference is that in Lai Hoon Woon, 
the asset in question was not “partnership property” at all – despite 
being held by the partners in exactly the same proportions as their 
partnership shares. One or more partners may hold an asset used in the 
firm’s business without it being partnership property, and this may be 
true even where the asset is jointly owned by all the partners in the same 
ratio as their partnership shares. Normally, an issue of separate property 
arises when one or more of the partners owned the asset before joining 
the partnership. It is a question of fact and intention whether such asset 
was contributed to the firm upon admission, and thereby became 
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partnership property, or remained as separate property. But a similar 
issue can also arise when an asset is first acquired from an outsider 
during the course of the partnership. In that case, there is a rebuttable 
presumption, under s 20(1) of the Partnership Act, that “[a]ll property … 
acquired … for the purposes and in the course of the partnership 
business [is] partnership property …” It does not appear that any claim 
was made in Lai Hoon Woon that the Boon Lay leasehold was 
partnership property, even though it was in fact purchased during the 
course of the partnership.49 Had such claim been made and established, 
the result may well have been different, as the plaintiff estate’s claim to a 
share of the partnership property would seemingly have been time-
barred, as in Mitre Hotel. 
                                                                        
49 Lai Hoon Woon v Lai Foong Sin [2016] SGHC 113 at [38]. 
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